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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jeremy Williams timely appeals from the district court's order revoking probation.
On appeal, Mr. Williams argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process
and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various transcripts he
requested be added to the record on appeal. Additionally, Mr. Williams argues that the
district court abused

discretion when it failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte in

both cases.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 40078 (hereinafter, First Case), Mr. Williams was charged, by
Information, with burglary and aiding and abetting a grand theft. (R Vol. I, pp.20-21.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to the foregoing charges and,
in return, the state agreed to dismiss a charge in an unrelated matter. (R Vol. I, pp.24A26.) On November 8, 2004, the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years,
with two years fixed, for burglary and a concurrent unified sentence of eight years, with
two years fixed, for aiding and abetting a grand theft. (R Vol. I, pp.56-57.) However,
the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (R Vol. I, pp.56-57.) Approximately,
233 days later, the district court entered an Order Returning Defendant to be placed on
probation and the following day, June 30, 2005, 1 the district court entered an order
suspending Mr. Williams' sentence and placing him on probation. (R Vol. I, pp.67-69.)

The district court automatically lost jurisdiction in this case on May 7, 2005, and all
subsequent proceedings in the First Case have been a legal nullity. See State v.
Petersen, 149 Idaho 808 (Ct. App. 2010).
1

1

In docket number 40077 (hereinafter, Second Case), Mr. Williams was charged,
by Information, with possession of a controlled substance. (R Vol. II, pp.133-134.) At a
consolidated change of plea and sentencing hearing, Mr. VVilliams pleaded guilty to
possession of a controlled substance. (R Vol. 11, pp.137-138.) Thereafter, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, to run concurrently
with the sentence in the sentence in the First Case. (R Vol. 11, pp.139-141.) The district
cou

also retained jurisdiction. (R Vol. 11, pp.139-141.) Upon review of Mr. Williams'

period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Williams' on probation. (R Vol. II, pp.139-141.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation in both
cases alleging that Mr. Williams violated the terms of his probation. (R Vol. I, p.72; R
Vol. II, p.149.)
consuming

Mr. Williams admitted to violating the terms of his probation by

alcohol,

driving

without

privileges,

changing

permission, and failing to pay for the costs of supervision.

his

residence without

(R Vol. I, p.72; R Vol. II,

p.149.)2 The district court then continued Mr. Williams' probation in both cases. (R Vol.
I, pp.79-80; R Vol. I, pp.156-157.)
After a second period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation
in both cases alleging that Mr. Williams violated the terms of his probation. (R Vol. I,
pp.84; R Vol. II, p.160.) Mr. Williams admitted to violating the terms of his probation for

being terminated from the Bonneville Count Drug Court due to his use of "spice" a
synthetic cannabinoid. 3 The district court revoked probation in both cases and retained
jurisdiction in both cases. (R Vol. I, pp.87-88; R Vol. II, pp.163-164.) Upon review of

2 See

Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule; Amended Motion to
Augment.
2

Mr. Williams' second rider, the district court suspended his sentences and placed him
on probation in both cases. (R Vol. I, pp.90-92; R Vol. II, pp.166-168.)
After a third period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation in
both cases alleging that Mr. VVilliams violated the terms of his probation.
pp.97-98; R Vol. II, pp.1

173.)

(R Vol. I,

Mr. Williams admitted to violating the terms of his

probation for being terminated from an aftercare program, associating with an individual
who was not approved by his probation officer, and smoking spice and marijuana.
(05/09/12 Tr., p.5, L.20 - p.8, L.1; 05/16/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-20.) Thereafter, the district
court revoked probation and executed the underlying sentences in both cases. (R Vol.
I, pp.103-104; R Vol. II, pp.178-179.)

Mr. Williams timely appealed in both cases.

(R Vol. I, pp.106-107; 181-182.)
In both cases, Mr. Williams then filed Rule 35 motions requesting leniency, which
were denied by the district court. 4 (R Vol. I, pp.112-113, 11

R Vol. II, pp.187-188,

191.)
On appeal, Mr. Williams filed a motion to augment the record with various
transcripts.

(Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected in part to Mr. Williams'

request for the transcripts. (Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion
to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting
his request for various transcripts but denied his request for transcripts of the change of
plea/sentencing hearing held on December 15, 2004, the admit/deny hearing held on
July 16, 2008, the disposition hearing held on August 27, 2008, and the admit/deny and

3 See

Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule; Amended Motion to
Augment.
4 Mr. Williams is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motions on appeal.
3

dispositional hearing held on August 18, 2010.
Motion to Augment), pp.1

)

4

(Order (hereinafter, Order Denying

ISSUES
1,

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. VVilliams due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts
for
review of the issues on appeal?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied failed
sentences sua sponte in both cases?

5

reduce his

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Williams Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Transcripts
Necessary For Review Of Issues On Appeal

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Williams filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of the
change of plea/sentencing hearing held on December 15, 2004, the admit/deny hearing
held on July 16, 2008, the disposition hearing held on August 27, 2008, and the
admit/deny and dispositional hearing held on August 18, 2010, that request was denied
by the Supreme Court.

On appeal, Mr. Williams is challenging the Idaho Supreme

Court's denial of his request for the transcripts. Mr. Williams asserts that the requested
transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion
when it failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation because the
applicable standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent
review of the entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's
sentencing decisions.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his

request.
6

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Williams With Access To
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Hirn Due Process And Equal Protection
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing
Claims
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a

criminal defendant due process of law.

See U.S. Const amend. XIV; Idaho Const

art.I§13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Depat1ment of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty, 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ). Const

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998).
In Idaho,

a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute.

See LC. § 19-2801.

Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a

relevant transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2);
LC. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id.

Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to

"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a).
7

An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an appeal
of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891
(Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is
an appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 11(c)(6)).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the
requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time,
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
8

sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
1 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as
follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
9

In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. The
United States Supreme Court ruled that "once the State chooses to establish appellate
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal."

Draper, 372 U.S. at 494.

The Court first expanded upon its statement in

Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is

available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the stenographic
transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id
at 495.

The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the

defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The Court ultimately
concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be adequately reviewed
without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to

10

prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If a review
of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts it becomes the
State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary for the appeal.
Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v Braaten,

44 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues
on appeal due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are
not relevant to the issues on appeal.

C.

The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Williams' Appeal Because He Is
Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire
Record Before The District Court
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this

appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "When we
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation."
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).

11

In other

words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's sentencing decision conducts an
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district
court's decisions. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not
required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665,
666 (1984).
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of a revocation of
probation order.

In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on

probation. Id. at 619.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating

the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. After he completed his rider, the district court placed the
defendant on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant
appealed from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-621. The Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the
appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court
12

of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination. Specifically
it held:
[IJn reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (original emphasis).

Morgan is distinguishable because Morgan was challenging the order revoking

probation and Mr. Williams is challenging the length of his sentence, which entails an
analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed
as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of
probation." 5 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the

In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process because it does not have the power to overrule
a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on to state
that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was filed
with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals and
contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules
require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example,
Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows:
5

All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the
13

requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation
revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to the
issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district court is not
limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal
is filed.

Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official

position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App.

2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved");

State v.

Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case

case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.A.R. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Mr. Williams is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to
file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 0 expressly
prohibits such filings. Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the Idaho Appellate Rules.
14

because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it already knows from
presiding over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking
probation.
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct.

App. 1989), where the

Court of Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record
when reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation
of probation the applicable standard

of review requires an independent and

comprehensive inquiry to the events which occurred prior to, as well as, the events
which occurred during the probation revocation proceedings.

The basis for this

standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the
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entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the
same facts."

Id.

The Court of Appeals did not state that the district court must

expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for
this standard of review to become applicable.

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals

assumed the judge will automatically consider the prejudgment events when
determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the
prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, as an appellate court will assume
that the district court will remember the events from the prior proceedings when it
executes a sentence after revoking probation.
In this case, the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling presided over the final disposition
hearing held on May 23, 2012.

(R., Vol. II, pp.175-177.)

Judge Shindurling also

presided over the change of plea/sentencing hearing held on December 15, 2004, the
admit/deny hearing held on July 16, 2008, the disposition hearing held on August 27,
2008, and the admit/deny and dispositional hearing held on August 18, 2010, (R Vol. II,

pp.137-139, 149-150, 153-155, 160-162.) As such, the Adams opinion indicates that an
appellate court will presume Judge Shindurling relied on his memory of those
proceedings when it executed Mr. Williams' sentences after revoking probation.
Therefore, transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for an appellate court to
review the merits of his appellate sentencing claims.
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Williams access to those transcripts
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation.

In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.

4 77 (1863), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be
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dismissed without the transcript.

Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81.

Similarly, in Idaho, an

appellant must provide an adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well

established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the
actions of the trial court."

State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing

State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538,

1

(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko,
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985)). If transcripts are missing, but the record contains
court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim
is possible, then transcripts are not necessary for appellate review, even though the
Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the
district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v.
Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Williams fails to provide the

appellate court with transcripts necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption
will apply and Mr. Williams' sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual
merits.

If it is state action alone which prevents him from access to the necessary

items, then such action is a violation of equal protection and due process and any such
presumption should no longer apply.
Moreover, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case and what
occurred at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's final
sentencing decision. When Mr. Williams was first placed on probation and given the
opportunity for multiple periods of probation, the district court must have found that the
circumstances were right to give him the opportunity to be a member of society. To
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ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a
negative, one-sided view of Mr. \Nilliams. Denial of access to the requested transcripts
has prevented Mr. Williams from addressing those positive factors in support of his
appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Williams argues that the events
which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate the district
court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for
a merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues
on appeal because the applicable standard of review of an appellate sentencing claim
requires the appellate court

conduct an independent review of all of the proceedings

before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not on the district
court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on appeal is if the
record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision.

As such, the

decision to deny Mr. Williams' request for the transcripts will render his appeal
meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support the district
court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a procedural bar to the review of

Mr. Williams' appellate sentencing claims on the merits and, therefore, he should either
be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied.
Since Mr. Williams' request for those transcripts was denied, that presumption should
be reversed in favor of Mr. Williams.
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D.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Williams VVith Access To
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal

In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court

recognized a due process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According
to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United

States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel

must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.

Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Williams has not obtained
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review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions
might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the
should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Williams on
the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Williams is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Williams his

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include a right to
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity
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to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of
that review.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Williams'
Sentences, Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Mindful of the fact that the district court automatically lost jurisdiction in the First
on or about May 7, 2005, Mr. Williams still asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte upon revoking his
probation.
In the Second Case, Mr. Williams asserts that, given any view of the facts, his
unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, is excessive.

Due to the district

court's power under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte
upon the revocation of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the
sentence as being excessive.

State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003).

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Williams does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. Williams must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
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was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id.

The governing criteria, or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
At the final probation disposition hearing, the State and Mr. Williams' trial counsel
both told the district court that the department of probation did not recommend that the
district court revoke probation. (05/23/12 Tr., p , L.6 - p.7, L.17.) In fact, his probation
officer recommended that the district court unsatisfactorily discharge Mr. Williams from
probation.

(05/23/12 Tr., p.7, Ls.14-16.) Trial counsel argued that Mr. Williams has

completed eight years of probation on these cases and he would "blend back into
society" if he was given his regular life back.

(05/23/12 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-24.)

That

contention is supported by the fact that at the time of the final probation violation,
Mr. Williams was earning a 3.4 GPA from Stevens-Henager College and has "good
support." (05/23/12 Tr., p6, Ls.23-24, p.9, Ls.3-6.)
In addition to the foregoing, there are various mitigating factors which support the
conclusion that Mr. Williams' sentences are excessive. Specifically, Mr. Williams had a
difficult childhood. His father was a Vietnam veteran with severe PTSD and a problem
with alcohol.

(2004 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,

PSI), p.7.) 6

Mr. Williams was also a ward of the State when he was either sixteen or seventeen
years old. (2004 PSI, p.7.) Mr. Williams also suffers from bi-polar disorder. (2004 PSI,
p.10.)

The 2004 PSI was created for the First Case. However, it was used by the district
court at sentencing in the Second Case. (R Vol. II, p.138.)
6
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Additionally, Mr. Williams' positive rider performance is a mitigating factor. While
on his first rider, Mr. Williams was a "motivated" participant in programming and earned
a probation recommendation from the Department of Correction. (2005 Addendum to
the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), pp.4, 7.) While on his second
rider, Mr. Williams did "good work" in the therapeutic community program. (2011 APSI,
p.3.) In fact, Mr. Williams took "full advantage" of the therapeutic community process,
which was evident by his behavior. (C-Notes Attached to the 2011 APSI, p.2.) Other
inmates viewed him as a "very good role model" and the staff viewed him as a
"dependable" person displaying "a real desire for recovery." (C-Notes Attached to the
2011 APSI, p.2.)

Mr. Williams earned a ninety-eight-percent on a certified driver's

license exam and "showed leadership" and "respect" toward his teachers assistants.
(C-Notes Attached to the 2011 APSI, p.3.)

He voluntarily participated in a vocational

safety program, earning his Occupational Safety and Health Administration certification.
(2011 APSI, p.3; C-Notes Attached to the 2011 APSI, p.4.)

He earned a workforce

readiness certificate and scored one hundred percent on his final exam for another
employment program. (C-Notes Attached to the 2011 APSI, p.1.) On various occasions
Mr. Williams would volunteer for small jobs when the opportunities arose.

(C-Notes

Attached to the 2011 APSI, pp.1-4.) One staff member wrote that Mr. Williams quickly
volunteered "with an extremely positive attitude and without hesitation."

(C-Notes

Attached to the 2011 APSI, p.4.) He ultimately earned a probation recommendation
from the Department of Correction after his second rider. (2011 APSI, p.4.)
Finally, Mr. Williams accepted responsibility for his behavior at the final
disposition hearing.

(05/23/12 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.2.)

despite his probation violations:
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Mr. Williams also said that

I [continue] to move forward with my life. Even with the decisions that I
make, I get back on top of it; I correct the decisions. I have had some very
emotional things happen since I have been out this time that has
contributed to my bad decision making. That doesn't excuse the fact, but I
do keep moving forward.
(05/23/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.6-12.)
In sum, Mr. Williams made some mistakes, but he was at a point in his life that
he was going to college and getting good grades. This drive to further his education is
consistent with

behavior on his second rider. Mr. Williams is not the same person

that was stealing from people in 2004.

It appears that Mr. Williams presents a

significantly lower risk to society now than he did in 2004.

As such, Mr. Williams'

sentences are excessively harsh.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this court reduce the indeterminate
portions of his sentences.

Alternatively, Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this

court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 19th day of February, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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